

**RAILROAD ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION**

**Report No 3812**

---

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

SAN ANTONIO, TEX

JULY 10, 1958

---

**INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION**

**Washington**

## SUMMARY

§§§

DATE	July 10, 1958	
RAILROAD	Missouri Pacific	
LOCATION	San Antonio, Tex	
KIND OF ACCIDENT	Rear-end collision	
TRAINS INVOLVED	Freight	Freight
TRAIN NUMBERS	261	Extra 314 South
LOCOMOTIVE NUMBERS	Diesel-electric units 605 and 603	Diesel-electric units 314, 596, 4198, and 341
CONSISTS	76 cars, caboose	Caboose
SPEEDS	Standing	20 m p h
OPERATION	Timetable and train orders, yard limits	
TRACK	Double, tangent, 0.05 percent ascending grade southward	
WEATHER	Clear	
TIME	11 05 p m	
CASUALTIES	4 injured	
CAUSE	Failure properly to control speed of following train moving within yard limits	

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

REPORT NO 3812

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER  
THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

October 31, 1958

Accident at San Antonio, Tex , on July 10, 1958, caused by failure properly to control the speed of the following train moving within yard limits


REPORT OF THE COMMISSION<sup>1</sup>

*TUGGLE, Commissioner*

On July 10, 1958, there was a rear-end collision between 2 freight trains on the Missouri Pacific Railroad at San Antonio, Tex , which resulted in the injury of 4 train-service employees

---

<sup>1</sup> Under authority of section 17 (2) of the *Interstate Commerce Act* the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Tuggle for consideration and disposition



### Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Palestine Division extending between San Antonio and Laredo, Tex., 153.1 miles. Between San Antonio and SA Jct., 4.2 miles south of San Antonio, this is a double-track line over which trains moving on the southward main track are operated by timetable and train orders, and trains moving with the current of traffic on the northward main track are operated by timetable, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. Within yard limits at San Antonio, a crossover, designated as the S A U & G Crossover, connects the main tracks. The north switch of the crossover, which is facing-point for southbound movements on the southward main track, is located 3.1 miles south of the station. A main track of the Kingsville Division parallels the main tracks on the east. A crossover connects this track with the northward main track. The north switch of this crossover, which is facing-point for southbound movements on the northward main track, is located 227 feet south of the north switch of S A U & G Crossover. The accident occurred within yard limits on the southward main track at a point 2.41 miles south of the station at San Antonio. The main tracks are tangent throughout a distance of 4,943 feet immediately north of the point of accident and a considerable distance southward. The grade for southbound trains on the southward main track is 0.05 percent ascending at the point of accident.

This carrier's operating rules read in part as follows:

#### DEFINITIONS

**Restricted Speed** —Proceed prepared to stop short of train, engine, obstruction or switch not properly lined

#### OPERATING RULES

93 Yard Limit Rule —\* \* \*

\* \* \*

Within yard limits, the main track may be used without protecting against second and inferior class trains, extra trains and engines.

Within yard limits, \* \* \* extra trains \* \* \* must move at restricted speed.

The maximum authorized speed for trains in the vicinity of the point of accident is 40 miles per hour.

The locomotives and the cabooses of the trains involved in the accident, and the yard office at San Antonio, are provided with two-way radio equipment for intercommunication.

#### Description of Accident

No. 261, a southbound second-class freight train, consisted of diesel-electric units 605 and 603, coupled in multiple-unit control, 76 cars, and a caboose. This train departed from San Antonio at 10:55 p. m., 2 hours 55 minutes late, and stopped on the southward main track with the rear end of the caboose 3,654 feet north of the north switch of the S A U & G Crossover. About 1 minute later the rear end of the caboose was struck by Extra 314 South.

Extra 314 South, a southbound freight train, consisted of diesel-electric units 314, 596, 4198, and 341, coupled in multiple-unit control, and a caboose. This train departed from San Antonio at 11 00 p.m. and while moving at an estimated speed of 20 miles per hour it struck the rear end of the caboose of No. 261.

The locomotive of Extra 314 South stopped with the front end 157 feet south of the point of accident. None of the equipment of this train was derailed. The caboose, and the 74th to the 76th cars, inclusive, of No. 261 were derailed and stopped in various positions on or near the track structure. The first diesel-electric unit of Extra 314 South was considerably damaged. The derailed cars of No. 261 were destroyed, and the 73rd car was slightly damaged.

The flagman of No. 261, and the fireman, the front brakeman, and the flagman of Extra 314 South were injured.

The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 11 05 p.m.

#### Discussion

As No. 261 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the enginemen and the front brakeman were in the control compartment of the first diesel-electric unit, and the conductor and the flagman were in the caboose. The marker lights at the rear of the caboose were lighted and were displaying a red aspect to the rear. This train stopped with the front end of the locomotive immediately north of the north switch of S A U & G Crossover. The front brakeman alighted and proceeded to line the switches of the crossovers for movement of the train to the main track of the Kingsville Division. The engineer said that he had released the brakes and was taking action to move the train southward when the brakes became applied in emergency as a result of the collision. The conductor observed Extra 314 South when it was closely approaching and called a warning to the flagman. The conductor alighted immediately before the collision occurred.

As Extra 314 South was approaching the point where the accident occurred the enginemen and the front brakeman were in the control compartment of the first diesel-electric unit, and the conductor, the flagman and the swing brakeman were in the caboose. The brakes of this train had been tested and had functioned properly when used en route. The headlight was lighted brightly. All members of the crew except the fireman estimated that the speed was about 20 miles per hour as the train was approaching the point where the accident occurred. The front brakeman said that he observed the caboose of No. 261 when it was about 400 feet distant and that he called a warning. The fireman said that shortly afterward he observed the caboose and also called a warning. The engineer said that he was not maintaining a constant lookout ahead at the time the warnings were called to him, and that he first saw the caboose on the track ahead when it was about 100 feet distant. He said that he then immediately initiated an emergency application of the brakes. However, the speed of the train was not materially reduced before the collision occurred.

This accident occurred within yard limits and under the rules of the carrier, Extra 314 South was required to be operated in such manner that it could be stopped short of a train, engine, obstruction, or switch not properly lined.

**Cause**

This accident was caused by failure properly to control the speed of the following train moving within yard limits

Dated at Washington, D C , this thirty-first  
day of October, 1958

By the Commission, Commissioner Tuggle

(SEAL)

Harold D McCoy,

Secretary